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1Abstract
A central challenge to monetary business-cycle theory is to ¯nd a solution to the problem
of persistence and delay in the real e®ects of monetary shocks. Previous research has identi¯ed
separately speci¯c factors and intermediate inputs as two promising mechanisms for generating
the persistence and delay in a staggered price-setting framework. Models based on either of
these two mechanisms have also been used in the design of optimal monetary policy.
By examining a staggered price model that features both speci¯c factors and intermediate
inputs, I ¯nd an o®setting interaction between the two individually promising mechanisms,
which leads to a cancelation of much of the impact of each in propagating monetary shocks.
This ¯nding posits a challenge to the search for robust monetary transmission mechanism and
design of optimal monetary policy.
Keywords: Speci¯c factors; Intermediate inputs; Strategic complementarities; Persistence;
Hump-shape
JEL classi¯cation: E24; E32; E52
21. Introduction
The search for a monetary business-cycle theory that can account for the relationship be-
tween money and other economic activity has long been a challenge. In meeting the challenge,
considerable e®ort has been made in the past decade to develop optimization-based sticky
price models, such as those described in Goodfriend and King (1997). These models, however,
have encountered di±culties in explaining some of the empirical regularities concerning the
volatility and co-movement of nominal and real aggregates [e.g., King and Watson (1996)].
In an important analysis, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) stress a substantial di±culty
faced by optimization-based staggered price models in explaining the persistence (and delay)
in the response of real economic activity to nominal disturbances. Earlier studies suggested a
promise of staggered price-setting for generating persistence. Yet, these authors demonstrate
that, when the rules for setting prices are derived endogenously, staggered price mechanism, by
itself, cannot generate much persistence. The problem is that, endogenous price-setting, even
if in a staggered fashion, does not generate a long period of endogenous nominal inertia from a
short period of exogenous nominal price stickiness that is not too much greater than suggested
by the empirical evidence of Bils and Klenow (2004), Bils, Klenow, and Kryvtsov (2003), and
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2003). They argue that a central challenge to monetary business cycle
theory is to ¯nd a solution to the persistence problem, but conclude that \mechanisms to solve
the persistence problem must be found elsewhere."
The failure of staggered price mechanism in generating persistence can be traced to the
lack of strategic complementarities between price-setter's behavior in this class of models.
This manifests the potential importance of real features of the economy for propagation of
nominal shocks, a view that also has a tradition in the literature.1 The past decade has
indeed witnessed a surge in interest in incorporating various real features into a staggered
price-setting framework to enhance the model. Two real features relevant for many industries
in most modern economies, speci¯c factor inputs and produced intermediate inputs, have
been separately identi¯ed as promising for generating strategic complementarities in pricing
1The use of the term \real features" is meant to be sentimental. It is referred to various market imperfections
that impede the response of marginal production cost to changes in output, which Ball and Romer (1990) call
\real rigidities", as well as various supply-side features that allow a more elastic response of output to changes
in demand without much increase in marginal cost, which Dotsey and King (2001) call \real °exibilities".
3and persistence in the real e®ects of nominal shocks.2 Models based on either of these two
mechanisms have also been used in the design of optimal monetary policy.3
Incidently, little work has been done to investigate jointly the two individually promising
mechanisms. By examining in this paper a staggered price model that features both speci¯c
factors and intermediate inputs, I identify an o®setting interaction between the two mecha-
nisms, which leads to a cancelation of much of the impact of each in propagating monetary
shocks. This is perhaps surprising given that intermediate inputs have been found to be re-
inforcing with some other real features in the previous literature.4 To my knowledge, this
paper is the ¯rst to show a detrimental interaction between two separately helpful real fea-
tures for propagating nominal shocks. It posits a challenge to the search for robust monetary
transmission mechanism and design of optimal monetary policy.
To drive this point home, I construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium staggered
price model, featuring jointly speci¯c factors and intermediate goods, with a constant elasticity
of substitution between these two sources of production inputs, as consistent with the empirical
evidence of Basu (1995) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996, 1999). My primary objective is
to investigate the nature of the interaction between the two real features for the transmission
of nominal shocks. In carrying out this investigation, I ¯rst establish a closed-form equilibrium
relation to decompose analytically the roles of the two mechanisms and of their interaction in
generating strategic complementarities in pricing. I then discuss the intuition for a positive
relationship between the degree of strategic complementarities and the amount of persistence
2See, among others, Kimball (1995), Rotemberg (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Gust (1997),
Ascari (2001), Bergin and Feenstra (2000, 2001), Edge (2002), Woodford (2003), and Huang and Liu (2001,
2002, 2003). The idea that factor speci¯cities might be important for the real e®ects of nominal shocks can be
traced back at least to Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Chapter 8) and Ball and Romer (1990, 1991) [see, also,
Dixon and Rankin (1994) for an early survey]. The idea on the relevance of intermediate inputs for the real
e®ects of nominal shocks can be traced back to an even earlier date to Means (1935), Gordon (1981, 1990),
and Blanchard (1983, 1987), and has been revisited recently by Basu (1995), Clark (1999), Hanes (1999), and
Linnemann (2000).
3See Woodford (2003) and Huang and Liu (2004), among others.
4In particular, Bergin and Feenstra (2000) ¯nd a nonlinear interaction between intermediate inputs and
translog preferences that goes beyond the sum of the individual contributions of the two real features to generat-
ing persistence. Dotsey and King (2001) consider intermediate inputs together with variable capacity utilization
and labor supply variability along the employment margin (in addition to the hours-worked margin), and they
¯nd that, not only the three real features separately contribute to generating persistence, but \their e®ects on
persistence are mutually reinforcing."
4and delay in the real e®ect of a nominal shock. I later derive an analytical solution for aggre-
gate dynamics to formally establish this positive linkage. In particular, I obtain a necessary
and su±cient condition for the response of real aggregate output to be hump-shaped, solve
analytically for the timing of the peak, and characterize both the condition and the timing by
the degree of strategic complementarities along with parameters governing the shock process.
These analytical results imply that the presence of intermediate inputs signi¯cantly weakens
the impact of speci¯c factors in propagating a nominal shock, while with the presence of speci¯c
factors the use of intermediate inputs in production serves even to dampen the real e®ect of
the shock. This detrimental interaction between the two individually promising mechanisms
leads to a reduction in the degree of strategic complementarities in pricing and persistence in
the response of real aggregate output, and diminishes the possibility of a hump in the impulse
response function or shifts the timing of the hump to an earlier date. Numerical simulations
lead to similar conclusions drawn from analytical results.
To understand this negative interaction, note that the basic idea of introducing real features
of the economy to magnify the real e®ect of a nominal shock rests upon the intuition that these
features may serve to dampen the desired price responses to changes in aggregate demand
condition. Mechanisms that either impede the response of marginal cost to changes in output,
or allow a more elastic response of output to changes in demand without causing too much
variation in marginal cost, are potential candidates.
To see why speci¯c factors are such a candidate, consider a nominal shock, such as a shock
to nominal money supply. Under staggered price-setting, the shock will cause a shift in factor
demand schedules and a change in real income, which will shift factor supply schedules. The
two schedule shifts reinforce to guide factor and good prices to adjust to the direction of the
shock. With factor speci¯cities, the demand for a factor input that is speci¯c to a ¯rm depends
directly on the demand facing the ¯rm for its output, and thus inversely on the relative price
of the output, which, given prices charged by other ¯rms, is determined by the factor price
to the extent it accounts for the ¯rm's marginal cost.5 Thus, any change in the relative good
price due to a movement in the factor price would cause a counter-forcing shift in the factor
demand schedule, which would o®set partially the shift induced by the shock when holding
constant the relative good price, resulting in smaller movements in the factor and good prices
in the ¯rst place. It is through this negative feedback between adjustments in factor prices and
5This is in contrast to the case with homogenous factor inputs, where the demand for a common factor input
depends on the demand for aggregate output, and thus is independent of any relative output price.
5adjustments in good prices that factor speci¯cities serve to restrain these price adjustments to
magnify the real e®ect of the shock.
Intermediate inputs are also such a candidate. Since movements in factor prices lead to
changes in good prices only to the extent they result in variations in marginal cost, and since
variations in marginal cost resulting from given movements in factor prices are scaled down
by the presence of intermediate inputs, a greater share of intermediate inputs in production
implies smaller adjustments in good prices to given movements in factor prices. Further, a
given shift in factor demand or supply schedules has a smaller e®ect on factor prices, the
greater is the elasticity of factor demand, which I show is an increasing function of the share
of intermediate inputs.
These two individually promising mechanisms are, however, counter-forcing when in joint
presence. On the one hand, the presence of an intermediate input attenuates the feedback
restraint embodied in factor speci¯cities through the two aforementioned channels that make
itself individually promising. First, with a larger share of intermediate inputs, given movements
in factor prices lead to smaller variations in marginal cost and smaller changes in good prices,
and thus the resulting counter-forcing shift in factor demand schedules, as induced by factor
speci¯cities, is smaller. Second, a larger share of intermediate inputs gives rise to a greater
factor demand elasticity, and thus the o®setting e®ect on factor price adjustments of a given
counter-forcing shift in factor demand schedules is smaller. On the other hand, such attenuating
e®ect is generally strong that it dominates the individual promise of intermediate inputs and
thus, with the presence of speci¯c factors in the ¯rst place, the use of intermediate inputs in
production serves even to dampen the real e®ect of a nominal shock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and de¯nes an
equilibrium. Section 3 presents the decomposition, provides some intuitions behind it, and uses
it to obtain analytical results and conduct numerical simulations to assess the consequence of
the o®setting interaction between speci¯c factors and intermediate inputs for strategic comple-
mentarities and persistence. Section 4 further details the results, by ¯rst deriving an analytical
solution for equilibrium dynamics to establish analytical linkages between the degree of strate-
gic complementarities and the amount of persistence in output impulse response, the likelihood
of a hump on the impulse response, and the timing of the hump, and then conducting numerical
simulations to con¯rm the conclusions drawn from these analytical results. Section 5 concludes.
Most derivations and proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
62. A Model of Speci¯c Factors and Intermediate Inputs with Staggered Pricing
The model features a representative household and a continuum of ¯rms indexed on the unit
interval [0;1], each of which produces a di®erentiated good. At each date t, a representative





i;t di]µ=(µ¡1), where µ 2 (1;1) is the elasticity of substitution between the
individually di®erentiated goods. The distributor takes the prices fPi;tgi2[0;1] of the individual
goods as given and chooses the bundle of the goods to minimize the cost of fabricating a given
quantity of the composite good. It sells the composite good to the household or ¯rms at its
unit cost ¹ Pt = [
R 1
0 P1¡µ
i;t di]1=(1¡µ). So it is assumed that the distributor cannot discriminate its
selling price between the household and the ¯rms, or across di®erent ¯rms. The demand for a







Units of the composite good purchased by the household can either be consumed directly
or be converted using linear technologies into a continuum of types of investment goods, while
the ¯rms purchase the composite good for use as an intermediate input in the production of
the di®erentiated goods.
2.1. Household
The household has a continuum of members, each of which possesses a di®erentiated labor
skill. In each period t, the household derives utility from its total consumption, while it cares
about the dis-utility of each of its members resulting from supplying to ¯rms their di®erentiated












where Et is the conditional expectation operator and ¯ 2 (0;1) is the household's subjective
discount factor. The arguments Ct and Lhi;t denote respectively the household's consumption
and quantity of labor of type i supplied in period t. The period-utility function, U, and the
period-disutility function, V , are strictly increasing and strictly decreasing, respectively, and
both are strictly concave and twice continuously di®erentiable.
At every date there is available for trade a complete set of one-period, state-contingent
nominal bonds, which the household can use to transfer its nominal wealth across dates and
states of the world. The no-arbitrage condition then implies the existence of a unique set of
stochastic discount factors, which can be used to determine at any date the nominal present
7value of a nominal quantity in any future date and state. Denote by Dt;t+1 the stochastic
discount factor from date t + 1 to t. The nominal price at t of a one-period bond that pays
o® one unit of nominal account in a particular state of the world at t + 1 is equal to Dt;t+1
times the probability that this particular state will indeed be realized at t + 1 conditional on
the information available at t. Other ¯nancial claims can similarly be priced. In particular, a
one-period bond issued at date t that pays o® one unit of nominal account in all states of the
world at t + 1 has a nominal value at t of EtDt;t+1, and thus a gross nominal interest rate of
(EtDt;t+1)¡1. In general, if the random quantity Bt represents the household's holdings at t
of the one-period, state-contingent nominal bonds, then this portfolio has a nominal value at
t of Et(Dt;t+1Bt).
The household's budget constraint in period t requires that its expenditures on consumption
and investment plus asset accumulation do not exceed its disposable income during the same
period, that is,
¹ PtCt + ¹ Pt
Z 1
0







Wi;tLhi;tdi + ¦t; (3)
where Ii;t and Khi;t¡1 denote the quantity of investment good of type i that the household
obtains in period t and its stock of capital of type i as of date t¡1, Rk
i;t and Wi;t are nominal
rental rate on capital of type i and nominal wage rate paid to labor of type i in period t, and
¦t represents the household's claim to ¯rms' pro¯ts in period t.
The household maximizes (2) subject to (3), a law of motion Ii;t = Khi;t ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Khi;t¡1,
for all i 2 [0;1], where ± 2 [0;1] is a depreciation rate common to all types of capital, and a
borrowing constraint Bt ¸ ¡B, for some large positive number B, which serves to prevent the
household from playing Ponzi schemes without bound. The household takes its initial capital
stocks fKhi;¡1gi2[0;1] and debt position B¡1, as well as all prices, wages, and capital rental
rates as given in solving the utility-maximization problem.
2.2. Firms




















where Xi;t, Kfi;t, Lfi;t represent the ¯rm's inputs of the intermediate good, capital, and labor,
respectively, and F is a real ¯xed cost which is common to all ¯rms. The parameter e 2 [0;1)
corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between the primary factors and the intermediate
input, ~ Á 2 [0;1) and ® 2 [0;1) will help determine the share of material cost in the production
8of gross output and the share of capital cost in the value-added inputs, respectively, and ~ ®
is a constant given by ®¡®(1 ¡ ®)¡(1¡®). The speci¯cation in (4) implies a unit elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital, which is a common assumption in the literature.
All ¯rms are input-price takers, but are imperfect competitors in output markets, where
they set prices for their products for N > 1 periods in a staggered fashion and supply at these
prices whatever quantities of the goods prescribed by the demand schedule (1). To be speci¯c,
all ¯rms are divided into N equally measured cohorts, where ¯rms in cohort 1 set new prices
in periods 0;N;2N;:::, ¯rms in cohort 2 set new prices in periods 1;N + 1;2N + 1;:::, and
so on. At each date t, if it is the time that a ¯rm i can set a new price, then it chooses Pi;t for




Dt;t+s[(1 + ¿)Pi;tZi;t+s ¡ Q(Zi;t+s) ¡ Tt]; (5)
where Dt;t+s =
Qs
r=1 Dt+r¡1;t+r denotes the s-period stochastic discount factor from date t+s
to t, for all s > 0, with Dt;t = 1, ¿ is a °at rate at which the ¯rm's output is subsidized, and
Tt is an indirect business tax common to all ¯rms. Here Q(Zi;t) represents the total cost of i
at t for producing Zi;t, which can be obtained by choosing Xi;t, Kfi;t, and Lfi;t to minimize
¹ PtXi;t + Rk
i;tKfi;t + Wi;tLfi;t, subject to (4), taking ¹ Pt, Rk
i;t, and Wi;t as given. This total cost
is given by
Q(Zi;t) = Qi;t[Zi;t + F]; where Qi;t =
½
~ Á ¹ P1¡e








The implied demands for the intermediate input, capital, and labor are, respectively,

















[Zi;t + F]; (8)










[Zi;t + F]: (9)
We note that even if a ¯rm cannot set a new price at a given date, it would still need to
solve the cost-minimization problem, and thus (6)-(9) must hold for all ¯rms in all periods.
Taking the demand schedule (1) and the cost function (6) as given, the solution to the pro¯t-








s=0 Dt;t+s ¹ Pµ
t+sZt+s
; (10)
9where ¹ ´ µ(µ¡1)¡1(1+¿)¡1 is the steady-state e®ective markup of price over marginal cost.6
Equation (10) says that a ¯rm's optimal price is a markup over a weighted average of its
marginal costs during the periods in which its currently chosen price will remain in e®ect.
Using (7)-(10), it can be veri¯ed that, in steady state, the share of payment to intermediate
inputs in total production cost is equal to Á = ~ Á¹1¡e.
2.3. Market Clearing and Equilibrium
I have thus far assumed implicitly that a di®erentiated good is produced using a speci¯c
type of capital and a speci¯c type of labor (together with an intermediate input), and that
nevertheless there is neither monopoly power of the household nor monopsony power of the
¯rms in the factor markets.7 To help connecting with the literature, it would be helpful to allow
the speci¯cation of the model to be °exible enough to nest the scenarios with homogeneous
capital ornand labor as special cases. I therefore introduce two binary variables, !1 and !2,
each of which can take on values 0 and 1, corresponding respectively to the case without
and with capital speci¯cities and the case without and with labor speci¯cities.8 The market
6Allowing a production subsidy ¿ = (µ¡1)
¡1 helps connect to the recent literature on monetary policy rules,
where a subsidy is often assumed to eliminate steady-state monopolistic distortions.
7One way to justify this assumption is to think of each point on the unit interval as consisting of a large
number of ¯rms that use the same type of capital and labor to produce one type of good, and each member
unit in the household as consisting of a large number of investors and workers who supply the same type of
capital and labor. Since there is a large number of participants on both demand and supply sides in each of
the factor markets, it is not theoretically objectionable to rule out the possibility of any collective behaviors in
these marketplaces and assume that all factor prices are determined in a competitive fashion. An alternative
approach is to think of the economy as consisting of N divisions (say, equally divided on the unit interval), with
a large number of ¯rms and household members in each division who supply goods (to the whole economy) and
factors (only to the local ¯rms) that are homogenous within division but di®erentiated across divisions, and
with prices for goods being set in a staggered fashion across divisions. One can then argue that competition in
factor markets within division would eliminate any monopoly or monopsony power in these markets. One can
interpret the divisions as regions, cities, industries, sectors, etc.
8My consideration of the all-or-nothing extremes regarding factor speci¯cities is only meant to be pathological.
A more realistic speci¯cation would be to allow for the possibility of conversions of di®erent \types" of factors
subject to converting costs, where \types" may be identi¯ed by specialties, regions, or attachments to industries
or ¯rms, so that factor prices may vary across suppliers-demanders for some periods following a shock, but have
a tendency to converge in the long run. Since it is mainly these short-run dynamics of factor prices that matter
for the determination of short-run responses of goods prices to shocks, which are what matter for the analysis
in this paper, my choice to consider the opposite extremes allows to capture e®ectively the essential ingredients
of factor speci¯cities without an explicit discussion of the converting costs alluded to.
10clearing conditions for capital and labor in period t can then each be expressed compactly as
!1Kfi;t + (1 ¡ !1)
Z 1
0




!2Lfi;t + (1 ¡ !2)
Z 1
0




for all i 2 [0;1], where I have assumed that at any date capitals available for ¯rms to rent are
accumulated by the household during the previous period. The market clearing condition for




0 Xi;tdi = Zt, where the sum of the ¯rst two
terms on the left hand side corresponds to real GDP or real aggregate spending, Yt. The bond
market clearing condition is standard.
An equilibrium for this model economy consists of allocations Ct, Bi;t, Khi;t, and Lhi;t, for
the household, allocations Xi;t, Kfi;t, and Lfi;t, and prices Pi;t, for a ¯rm i, for all i 2 [0;1],
together with stochastic discount factors Dt;t+1, prices ¹ Pt, capital rental rates fRk
i;tgi2[0;1], and
wages rates fWi;tgi2[0;1], that satisfy the following conditions: (i) taking capital rental rates
and wage rates, as well as all prices but its own as given, each ¯rm's allocations and prices
solve its pro¯t-maximization problem; (ii) taking capital rental rates and wage rates, as well
as all prices as given, the household's allocations solve its utility-maximization problem; (iii)
markets for bonds, capital, labor, and the composite good clear; (iv) total production subsidy
is equal to total indirect business tax.
3. Analytics of Micro-Foundations
In this section, I derive an aggregate supply relation and use this relation to investigate
the micro-foundation underlying the roles of speci¯c factors and intermediate inputs and, in
particular, of their interaction in generating strategic complementarities between the price-
setting decisions by ¯rms that supply di®erentiated goods, and persistence in the real e®ects of
nominal disturbances. To help achieve analytical transparency, I follow a common approach to
approximate the equilibrium conditions by a log-linear system. In what follows, I use lowercase
letters to denote the log-deviations of corresponding level variables from their steady-state
values. To help obtain closed-form solutions, I shall assume until further notice that aggregate
capital is constant with no depreciation.
3.1. Aggregate Supply














11where I have set ¯ = 1 to simplify notations. Here, ¹ pt and ~ yt correspond to the price level and
nominal aggregate spending, and pt denotes the price set at time t by a ¯rm that can choose a
new price at t. Since ¯rms are identi¯ed by the timing of their price-setting decisions, I have


















®(1+»)!1+»(1¡®)!2 ¡ 1 + eÁ
#¡1
(14)
where IF is an indicator function that takes on the value of 1 if F > 0 and 0 if F = 0, and
¾ = ¡CU00=U0 and » = LV 00=V 0 denote steady-state relative risk aversions in consumption and
hours worked, respectively. Clearly, ¡ > 0 for all admissible values of the model's parameters.
In what follows, I will only present the results for the case with no ¯xed cost since the results
for the case with ¯xed cost are strikingly similar.9
Equation (13) prescribes the optimal pricing behavior of a ¯rm that can only reset its price
once every N periods. Could the ¯rm reset its price at every date, it would prefer a \desired"
price p¤
t at time t given by
p¤
t = (1 ¡ ¡)¹ pt + ¡~ yt: (15)
The fact that the ¯rm can only change its price infrequently implies that the actual price it sets
for its entire contract duration will only approximate its desired price in each of the contract








Note that pt so chosen at time t must remain in e®ect for all periods from t through t+N ¡1,
and it is in this sense that the mere existence of nominal price contracts by itself already
implies a certain degree of nominal price stickiness. Although I shall not attempt here to say
anything new about the underlying reasons for the existence of such contracts, but rather treat
their existence as a structural feature of the environment in which ¯rms sell their products, it
is important to note, as many empirical studies indicate, that the length of nominal contracts
observed in actual economies on average is too short to, by itself, explain the persistent real
e®ects of nominal disturbances [e.g., Taylor (1999), Bils and Klenow (2004), Bils, Klenow, and
Kryvtsov (2003), and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2003)]. Thus a useful model must explain when
a ¯rm may choose not to change its price by much even if it has the chance to adjust the price.
9These results are available upon request from the author.
12The answer to this question hinges upon the magnitude of (1 ¡ ¡), which determines how
a ¯rm's desired price, p¤
t, depends upon the level of prices charged by other ¯rms, ¹ pt, under
an arbitrarily speci¯ed stochastic process for the nominal spending, ~ yt. Pricing decisions are
strategic complements (substitutes) if a ¯rm's desired price would vary in the same (opposite)
direction as does the level of prices charged by other ¯rms.10 It can be seen from (15) that
strategic complementarities (substitutability) exist if and only if ¡ < 1 (¡ > 1). To see
the signi¯cance of strategic complementarities for persistence in the real e®ects of nominal
disturbances, note that ¡ measures the response of p¤
t to variations in ~ yt, given the response of
¹ pt. If ¡ < 1, then a one percent change in ~ yt will induce a less than one percent change in p¤
t,
so long as the change in ¹ pt is less than one percent. Hence, a ¯rm will price less aggressively if
other ¯rms do. As all ¯rms price less aggressively, the response of real output becomes more
persistent. Such a linkage between strategic complementarities and persistence will be made
more transparent in Section 4. The general conclusion is that, a smaller value of ¡ implies a
greater degree of strategic complementarities between the price-setting decisions by ¯rms and
a more persistent e®ect of nominal disturbances on real economic activity.
The question then is: How would the presence of speci¯c factors and intermediate inputs
a®ect the magnitude of ¡? To answer this question, one can appeal to the right-hand side of
(14), which decomposes the e®ect on ¡ of intermediate inputs into four multiplicative terms
and summarizes that of speci¯c factors into the last one. Indeed, with homogeneous capital and
labor inputs (i.e., with !1 = !2 = 0), this last term is equal to 1. Since the ¯rst three terms are
each decreasing in Á, a larger share of intermediate inputs tends to lower ¡ through lowering
these terms. This explains why a number of studies ¯nd that the presence of intermediate
inputs with factor homogeneity helps generate strategic complementarities and persistence.11
Similarly, since the last term is smaller than 1 if !1 and !2 are not both 0, the allowance
for factor speci¯cities tends to lower ¡ through factoring in this less-than-unit term. This
explains why several studies ¯nd that the presence of speci¯c factors helps increase the degree
of strategic complementarities and persistence.12
10This notion of strategic complementarities (substitutability) is similar to that used in Woodford (2003). For
a more general characterization of strategic complementarities (substitutability) in a somewhat broader context,
see, among others, Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985), Cooper (1999), and the references cited therein.
11See, for example, Bergin and Feenstra (2000), Huang and Liu (2001, 2003), and Dotsey and King (2001).
12See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Gust (1997), Ascari (2001), Edge (2002), Woodford (2003), and
Huang and Liu (2003), among others.
13More importantly, the last term on the right-hand side of (14) captures the e®ect on ¡
of the interaction between speci¯c factors and intermediate inputs. It shows that these two
individually promising mechanisms are counter-forcing when in joint presence. To see this,
note that this last term is an increasing function of Á. Thus, the presence of intermediate
inputs reduces the in°uence of factor speci¯cities on ¡ and thus on strategic complementarities
and persistence. This reduction is driven by two mutually reinforcing forces: the one in the
numerator, (1¡Á), is at work regardless of the value of e, while the one in the denominator, Á, is
at work as long as e > 0, and this force is stronger, the greater is e. In fact, as I will show below,
such negative e®ect is so strong that it generally dominates the e®ects of intermediate inputs on
¡ as via the ¯rst three terms on the right-hand side of (14). As a consequence, with the presence
of speci¯c factors in the ¯rst place, the use of intermediate inputs in production serves even
to increase the magnitude of ¡, and thus to decrease the degree of strategic complementarities
in pricing and dampen the real e®ect of nominal disturbances.
3.2. Some Intuitions
Before examining in more details the negative interaction between the two separably helpful
real features of the economy, I provide ¯rst some intuitions for why ¡ can be decomposed into
the four terms as of the right-hand side of (14), which is the key to understanding why the two
mechanisms are individually helpful, but o®setting when in joint presence. To carry through
the intuitions in a transparent way without loss of insights, I shall base my discussions here
on the case with no capital or production subsidy. Setting ® = ¿ = 0 (along with F = 0),
equation (14) simpli¯es to

















where I have set !2 = 1 to capture labor speci¯cities.
Recall that ¡ determines a ¯rm's desired price response to variations in nominal spending,
given the price responses of other ¯rms. It can be seen from rewriting (15) into p¤
t ¡ ¹ pt = ¡yt,
where yt denotes changes in real GDP, that ¡ also links the ¯rm's desired relative price change
to variations in real income, or real aggregate demand. As mentioned before, these variations
would lead to reinforcing shifts in the household's labor supply schedule and the ¯rm's labor
demand schedule, causing the real wage faced by the ¯rm to adjust in accordance with the last
three terms in (17).
To see that intermediate inputs are an individually promising mechanism, ¯rst note that
a movement in the real wage induces a change in the ¯rm's desired relative price only to the
14extent such movement causes a variation in the ¯rm's marginal cost. Since the variation in
marginal cost resulting from a given movement in the real wage is scaled down by the share
of intermediate inputs in production, a greater share of intermediate inputs implies a smaller
adjustment in the desired relative price to a given movement in the real wage. More speci¯cally,
the desired relative price change is (1 ¡ Á) fraction of the real wage adjustment since, with Á
share of intermediate inputs in production, a one percent change in real wage results in only a
(1¡Á) percent change in real marginal cost. This is why (1¡Á) shows up as the ¯rst term in
(17), which illustrates the ¯rst channel by which intermediate inputs are individually helpful.
The second channel that makes intermediate inputs individually helpful has to do with
the fact that the real wage adjusts according to the middle two terms in (17), in addition to
the last term. As a matter of fact, these middle two terms characterize the equilibrium wage
adjustment for the case with labor homogeneity. Since a one percent change in real income
causes a ¾=» percent shift in the labor supply schedule, ¾=» shows up as one component of
the second term.13 Since a one percent change in real aggregate demand causes a one percent
shift in the labor demand schedule, 1 shows up as another component of the second term.14 In
sum, the term (¾=» + 1) summarizes the extents of the two schedule shifts.15 The next term
is the inverse of the sum of the absolute values of the elasticities of labor supply, 1=», and of
labor demand, ¡eÁ=[Á + µ(1 ¡ Á)].16 This is an inverse relationship, since the more elastic
13Note that the relative risk aversion in consumption, ¾, determines how fast the household's marginal utility
of consumption falls (rises) as its income rises (falls), and the relative risk aversion in hours worked, », determines
how rapidly its marginal dis-utility of working falls (rises) as its hours worked fall (rise). Therefore, ¾=» measures
the desired change in the household's labor supply with respect to a change in its real income at any given wage
rate. This can be seen more transparently from rewriting the log-linearized labor supply schedule (34) in the
Appendix as l = (1=»)(w ¡ ¹ p) ¡ (¾=»)y.
14This can be seen more transparently by combining (33), (35), (37), and (38) in the Appendix, while setting
® = ¿ = F = !2 = 0, to derive the labor demand schedule l = ¡feÁ=[Á + µ(1 ¡ Á)]g(w ¡ ¹ p) + y, with the real
aggregate demand, y, rather than total sales, z, as a shift variable. Note that, with labor homogeneity, there is
only an economy-wide prevailing real wage, the change in which will cause a change in the di®erence between z
and y [this can be seen by combining (33) and (35), recognizing that all wi are equal to some economy-wide w].
15Note that this term is strictly decreasing in Á in the presence of a ¯xed cost, as is clear from (14).
16See Footnotes 13 and 14. To understand this expression for labor demand elasticity, note that, any variations
in the real wage would create an incentive for the ¯rm to substitute between intermediate inputs and labor. By
de¯nition, as long as both of these two factor inputs are used in production, a larger e implies that it is easier
to substitute between them. On the other hand, the larger is Á, the more important are materials relative to
labor in production, and thus the more sensitive is the demand for labor to variations in the real wage, as long
as there is some degree of substitutability between the two factors. This is why this labor demand elasticity is
increasing in e for Á > 0 and increasing in Á for e > 0. In contrast, it is decreasing in µ for e > 0 and Á 2 (0;1).
15the labor supply schedule or the labor demand schedule is, the smaller is the equilibrium wage
adjustment resulting from a given shift in either of these two schedules. Since the absolute
value of the labor demand elasticity is increasing in the share of intermediate inputs, a given
shift in the labor demand or supply schedule has a smaller e®ect on the real wage, the greater
is the share of intermediate inputs in production. This illustrates the second channel by which
intermediate inputs are individually helpful.
The mechanism that makes labor speci¯cities an individually promising real feature has to
do with the fact that the real wage adjusts also according to the last term in (17), in addition
to the middle two terms. As is clear from the decomposition, this last term captures the
e®ect of labor speci¯cities on the adjustment in the real wage faced by the ¯rm. Since the
¯rm employs a speci¯c type of labor, the demand for this labor input depends directly on the
demand facing the ¯rm for its output, and thus inversely on the relative price of the output
which, given the prices charged by other ¯rms, is determined by the real wage to the extent
it accounts for the ¯rm's marginal cost.17 Thus, any change in the relative price due to a
movement in the real wage would cause a counter-forcing shift in the labor demand schedule,
which would o®set partially the shift induced by variations in real aggregate demand when
holding constant the relative price, resulting in smaller movements in the real wage and in
the relative price at the ¯rst place. It is through this negative feedback between adjustments
in the real wage and adjustments in the desired relative good price that labor speci¯cities
serve to restrain the adjustments in the wage and the price to magnify the real e®ect of the
nominal disturbance. The larger is the price elasticity of demand for goods, µ, the greater is
This is so since a larger µ implies a greater elasticity of substitution between the individually di®erentiated
goods, and thus the ¯rm can rely less on substitution between the composite intermediate input and labor while
more on substitution between the individual goods. As a consequence, when µ increases, the ¯rm's demand for
labor becomes less sensitive to variations in the real wage. This tension between these two dimensions of factor
substitutions exists if only if both intermediate inputs and labor are used in production and there is some degree
of substitutability between them. This is why µ enters this elasticity only if Á 6= 0 or 1 and e > 0.
17To see this more clearly, combine (33) and (43), while setting ® = 0 and N = 1, to derive the desired relative
price response by a type i ¯rm to changes in its real wage cost as p
¤
i ¡ ¹ p = (1 ¡ Á)(wi ¡ ¹ p), and combine (33),
(37), and (38), while setting ® = ¿ = F = 0 and !2 = 1, to derive the schedule of demand for a type i labor as
li = ¡eÁ(wi ¡ ¹ p) ¡ µ(p
¤
i ¡ ¹ p) + z, with the total sales, z, as a shift variable. Note that, with labor speci¯cities,
there is a prevailing real wage for each type of labor, and an individual change in one prevailing wage does not
a®ect the di®erence between z and y [again, this can be seen by combining (33) and (35), recognizing that wi
may be di®erent from wj for i 6= j]. Also note that, in the case with homogenous labor input, the labor demand
schedule is dependent of the demand for aggregate output, but independent of any relative output price (see
Footnote 14).
16the counter-forcing shift resulting from a given change in the relative price; and, the greater
is the labor supply elasticity, »¡1, the smaller is the o®setting e®ect of a given counter-forcing
shift on the adjustment in the real wage. This is why this last term is decreasing in µ but
increasing in »¡1.18
More importantly, this very last term in (17) also captures the o®setting interaction between
the two individually promising mechanisms. On the one hand, the presence of intermediate
inputs attenuates the feedback restraint embodied in labor speci¯city and thus its impact on
the real wage adjustment. This is done through the two channels that make intermediate inputs
themselves individually promising. First, with Á share of intermediate inputs in production, a
one percent movement in the real wage leads to only a (1¡Á) percent change in the ¯rm's real
marginal cost. Thus, the ¯rm's desired relative price change in response to a given movement
in the real wage is attenuated by a factor of Á, and so is the resulting counter-forcing shift in
the labor demand schedule as induced by labor speci¯city (see Footnote 17). This is why in this
last term, µ is multiplied by (1¡Á). Second, given e > 0, a larger Á gives rise to a greater labor
demand elasticity, imputed to which a smaller o®setting e®ect on the real wage adjustment of
a given counter-forcing shift in the labor demand schedule (see Footnotes 14-17). This is why
in this last term, eÁ is added to »¡1. These two sources of attenuation reinforce to weaken the
power of labor speci¯cities in generating strategic complementarities and persistence.19 On
the other hand, such negative interaction is so strong that its e®ect generally dominates the
e®ects of intermediate inputs on ¡ as via the ¯rst three terms on the right-hand side of (17)
that capture their individual promise. As a result, with the presence of labor speci¯cities in the
¯rst place, the use of intermediate inputs in production serves even to increase the magnitude
of ¡, and thus to decrease the degree of strategic complementarities and persistence.
18This is to say, a greater labor supply elasticity reduces the contribution of labor speci¯cities to lowering ¡.
If we set Á = 0 in (17), then ¡ = (¾ + »)=(1 + µ»), which is an increasing function of »
¡1 provided that µ¾ > 1.
This is in contrast to the case with labor homogeneity, where ¡ is given by (¾ + »), which is clearly decreasing
in »
¡1. Thus, in the absence of intermediate inputs in production, a higher elasticity of labor supply implies a
larger degree of persistence in the case with labor homogeneity, but a smaller degree of persistence in the case
with labor speci¯cities. It can be shown that, in the case with intermediate inputs and labor homogeneity, ¡ is
decreasing, invariant, or increasing with »
¡1, if (¾e ¡ 1)Á is less than, equal to, or larger than µ(1 ¡ Á). Since
the use of intermediate inputs also reduces the contribution of labor speci¯cities to lowering ¡, when both these
two real features are present, ¡, and thus the degree of persistence, become less sensitive to the magnitude of
labor supply elasticity, as will be illustrated by the results to be reported in the subsequent sections.
19It is worth noting that this last term in (17) is an increasing function of not only Á, but also e for any Á > 0.
This should be in contrast with the third term in (17), which is an decreasing function of e for any Á > 0.
173.3. Analytical Result
In this section, I further illustrate the consequence of the negative interaction between
speci¯c factors and intermediate inputs in the light of (14). The following proposition shows
that this interaction not only leads to a reduction in the in°uence of factor speci¯cities on
strategic complementarities and persistence, but generally turns intermediate inputs into a
detrimental device. To help exposition, I present here the analytical result only for the case
with no capital, and leave the discussion on the quantitative implications of the more general
result for the case with capital to the next section.
Proposition 3.1: Set ® = F = 0, and !2 = 1. Fixed ¾ ¸ 0, » > 0, µ > 1. Then, for any
e > e ´ ¹[»2µ + »(1 ¡ ¹)]¡1, ¡(Á) is C1 on [0;1), and there exist 0 < Á¤ < Á¤¤ < 1 such that
¡0(Á) > 0 if Á 2 [0;Á¤); \ = " if Á = Á¤; \ < " if Á 2 (Á¤;1); (18)
¡(Á) > ¡(0) if Á 2 (0;Á¤¤); \ = " if Á = Á¤¤; \ < " if Á 2 (Á¤¤;1); (19)
where ¡0(0) is de¯ned as the right-hand derivative of ¡(Á) at Á = 0.
According to the proposition, under fairly general parameter restrictions, the presence of
intermediate inputs reduces the contribution of labor speci¯cities to lowering ¡ so signi¯cantly
that the e®ect more than o®sets their contribution to lowering ¡ under labor homogeneity in
a local and in a global sense with respect to the intermediate input share, unless the share
exceeds two successive threshold values, Á¤ and Á¤¤. The parameter values under which the
proposition holds largely cover their empirically plausible ranges. For example, the long-run
average markup of price over marginal cost is empirically small, suggesting a value of e close
to »¡2µ¡1.20 In the case with no production subsidy and a markup of 5%, corresponding to a
value of µ of 21, the proposition holds for all e > 0:0005 if » = 10, for all e > 0:002 if » = 5, and
for all e > 0:05 even if » is as small as 1 (corresponding to an hours-worked elasticity as large
as 1). Even for a markup as large as 11%, corresponding to a value of µ as small as 10, these
lower bounds on e are only increased by a factor of about 2, and thus stay small in general.
In the case with a production subsidy that eliminates steady-state monopolistic distortions,
these lower bounds on e are even smaller. According to the recent estimates by Basu (1995)
and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996, 1999), a value of e in the range of 0:36 and 0:69 can be
empirically plausible.
20While most studies have a markup of about 11%, the recent studies by Basu and Fernald (1997b, 2000)
suggest it can be as small as 5% once controlling for capacity utilization rates.
183.4. Quantitative Implications
I turn now to assessing the quantitative implications of the more general result for the case
with capital. To save space, from now on and throughout the rest of the paper, I shall continue
to focus my discussion and analysis for the case with capital but without production subsidy.21
Figure 1 plots ¡ against the share of intermediate inputs, Á, under factor speci¯cities. In
generating the ¯gure, ® is set to 0:33, as is standard in the literature.22 The elasticity of
substitution between di®erentiated goods, µ, is set equal to 10, as in Chari et al. (2000). There
are four panels in the ¯gure, each under a di®erent combination of values for the relative risk
aversion in consumption, ¾, and in hours worked, ». Though some studies suggest that the
value of ¾ can be as small as 0 or as large as 30, the general consensus is that it is between
1 and 10 [e.g., Prescott (1986), Mehra and Prescott (1985, 1988), and Kocherlakota (1996)].
The value of » is set in the range from 5 to 20, corresponding to intertemporal hours-worked
elasticity of 20% to 5%, as to be consistent with the empirical evidence.23 The consensus in
the literature about the value of e, the elasticity of substitution between primary factors and
intermediate inputs, is that it is between 0 and 1.24 For tractability, however, an extreme value
of e, either 0 or 1, is often assumed in the existing studies.25 I take here a diagnostic approach
and thus each panel displays ¡ for ¯ve di®erent values of e, ranging from 0 to 1.
21The results for the cases with production subsidy ornand without capital are qualitatively similar and
quantitatively more striking. These results are not reported here but available upon request from the author.
22In the light of the evidence that long-run pro¯ts are close to zero [e.g., Basu and Fernald (1997a)], ® should
correspond closely to the share of cost of capital in total value added in the National Income and Product
Account (NIPA), with an implied value of about one third. For the case with a ¯xed cost in the production
function (4), and given the assumption that total production subsidy is equal to total lump-sum tax, ® can be
formally calibrated to 0:33 using consistent NIPA data, by setting the steady-state ratio of ¯xed cost to gross
output equal to (µ ¡ 1)
¡1 (so that steady-state pro¯ts are zero and there are no incentives for ¯rms to enter or
exit industries in the long run).
23See, for example, Pencavel (1986), Altonji (1986), Ball (1990), and Card (1994). Similar results have been
obtained for greater labor supply elasticities, such as those suggested by MaCurdy (1983), Mulligan (1998),
Kimmel and Kniesner (1998), and Rupert, Rogerson, and Wright (2000). See Footnote 18.
24See, for example, the aforementioned estimates by Basu (1995) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996, 1999).
In the case with ¹ > 1, restricting e to being less than 1 has a theoretical advantage in addition to its seeming
empirical merit: for any Á between 0 and 1, the corresponding ~ Á also lies between 0 and 1. If ¹ = 1, however,
then ~ Á = Á regardless of the value of e.
25For the Leontief speci¯cation (i.e., e = 0), see, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) and Woodford
(2003). For the Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation (i.e., e = 1), see, among others, Basu (1995), Bergin and Feenstra
(2000, 2001), Linnemann (2000), Hillberry and Hummels (2002), Ambler et al. (2002), Huang and Liu (2003),
and Yi (2003). Basu and Kimball (1997) consider both speci¯cations.
19As can be seen from the ¯gure, if e is set to 0, then ¡ is almost invariant to changes in
Á, implying that the reduction in the impact of factor speci¯cities on ¡ due to the presence
of intermediate inputs is signi¯cant enough to essentially cancel out the impact of the latter
on ¡ under factor homogeneity [see, also, Woodford (2003)]. In contrast, in all cases with
e > 0, as Á rises from 0, ¡ keeps increasing until Á reaches a threshold value, Á¤, then ¡
starts to decrease, but will stay above its value at Á = 0 until Á reaches another threshold
value, Á¤¤. This implies that, locally for all Á · Á¤ and globally for all Á · Á¤¤, the presence of
intermediate inputs reduces the contribution of factor speci¯cities to lowering ¡ so signi¯cantly
that the e®ect more than o®sets their contribution to lowering ¡ under factor homogeneity. In
consequence, as Á rises from 0 to Á¤, the degree of strategic complementarities and persistence
will keep declining, and will then start to increase as Á rises further, but will continue to be
smaller than in the case without intermediate inputs, until Á rises above Á¤¤. This pattern of
¡ in varying with Á is consistent with what is suggested by Proposition 3:1.
Two observations at this point are worth mentioning. First, in all panels of the ¯gure,
the threshold value Á¤ lies between 0:4 and 0:7 or in its close vicinity, which conforms to an
empirically reasonable range for the share of payment to intermediate inputs in total production
cost.26 The threshold value Á¤¤, on the other hand, lies far beyond this range and is often
close to 1. Second, when Á takes on values in this range, the magnitude of ¡ is often several
times greater than its value at Á = 0 even for small or moderate e. In the lower-right panel,
for instance, the value of ¡ is about 0.13 if Á = 0, while if Á takes on values in its empirically
plausible range ¡ can be as large as 0:27 for e = 0:1, 0:34 for e = 0:2, 0:46 for e = 0:5, and
0:58 for e = 1.27 Recall that a value of e between 0:36 and 0:69 is empirically plausible in the
26With markup pricing, Á, which measures the cost share, equals the share of intermediate inputs in gross
output times the steady-state markup. Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987) estimate the revenue share of
materials in total U.S. manufacturing output of at least 50 percent over the period 1947-1979. A similar ¯gure
can be obtained using more recent data covering 1958-1996 for 459 4-digit SIC U.S. manufacturing industries
from the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database (constructed by Eric J. Bartelsman, Randy A. Becker,
and Wayne B. Gray, 2000), with much of it derived from the U.S. Annual Survey of Manufacturing. Huang, Liu,
and Phaneuf (2004) using data in the 1998 Annual Input-Output Table of the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA, 1998) estimate the ratio of \total intermediate" to \total industry output" for the manufacturing sector
of 0:6. Incidentally, Nevo (2001) ¯nds the share of raw materials in the U.S. food industry (SIC 20) of also about
0.6, based on the Annual Survey of Manufacturers over the period 1988-1992. The recent historical study by
Hanes (1999) indicates that the input-output structure in U.S. economy was less sophisticated in the interwar
period than in the postwar period, suggesting a possibly smaller value of Á before World War II.
27A value of ¡ in the range of 0:10 to 0:15 is required to generate substantial strategic complementarities to
explain roughly the observed degree of sluggishness of aggregate price adjustments in response to variations in
20light of the estimates by Basu (1995) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996, 1999). Together,
these observations suggest that the consequence of the o®setting interaction between speci¯c
factors and intermediate inputs for strategic complementarities and persistence is signi¯cant
for empirically plausible parameter values.
4. Implications for Macro-Dynamics
In this section, I solve analytically for equilibrium dynamics to make transparent how ¡
determines the response of real aggregate output to variations in nominal aggregate expenditure
or shocks in money supply. I then derive a necessary and su±cient condition for the response to
be hump-shaped, solve analytically for the timing of the peak, and characterize the condition
and the timing by ¡ along with parameters governing a shock process. Together, these establish
the positive relationship between the degree of strategic complementarities in pricing and the
amount of persistence and delay in the real e®ect of a nominal shock. This relationship, when
coupled with those results derived in the previous section, indicates a potentially signi¯cant
consequence of the o®setting interaction between speci¯c factors and intermediate inputs for
propagation of nominal shocks. Finally, I simulate the model to con¯rm conclusions drawn
from analytical results. In particular, I demonstrate, using impulse response functions, how the
interaction between the two individually promising features reduces the degree of persistence in
the response of real aggregate output, and diminishes the possibility of a hump in the impulse
response function or shifts the timing of the hump to an earlier date.
4.1. Impulse Response Functions: Closed-Form Solutions
I begin by deriving closed-form solutions for equilibrium dynamics. Substituting into (13)
the equation de¯ning the price level, ¹ pt+s = 1
N
PN¡1
r=0 pt+s¡r, for s = 0;:::;N ¡ 1, collecting
terms and rearranging, I obtain
pt =
1 ¡ ¡









where bs equals (N ¡ jsj)=N for s 6= 0 and 0 for s = 0.
To help sharpen the results, I will set N equal to 2 throughout this subsection, so that
there is a minimum amount of exogenous nominal stickiness. In accordance, (20) simpli¯es
to a second order di®erence equation in pt. Applying to it the standard methods for solving
nominal expenditure under the observed frequency of price adjustments in an economy such as that of the U.S.
See, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
21linear di®erence equations and the law of iterated expectations, I obtain a recursion in pt,
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Denote by ¹t the growth rate in nominal aggregate spending ~ yt. Combining (21) and its lagged
version with the relation ~ yt = ¹ pt + yt, and using again the equation de¯ning the price level, I
obtain a recursion in real GDP, yt, as











(Et¹t+j + Et¡1¹t+j¡1) + Et¹t+i+1 + Et¡1¹t+i]; (23)
with the understanding that
P0
j=1(Et¹t+j + Et¡1¹t+j¡1) ´ 0.
The autoregressive coe±cient a in (23) is the key to determining how an initial response
of yt to an innovation in ¹t will evolve over time. As will become more clear below, a bigger
a implies a larger degree of persistence in output response and a greater possibility of a hump
in the impulse response function. In the light of (22), a is a monotone decreasing function of
¡, and is smaller than 1 in absolute value for all ¡ > 0. If ¡ ¸ 1, then a 2 (¡1;0], and there is
no endogenous persistence in output dynamics. If ¡ < 1, then a 2 (0;1), and output response
is endogenously persistent. That is to say, persistence exists if and only if there are strategic
complementarities between the pricing decisions by ¯rms. The smaller ¡ is, the larger is a,
and the greater is the degree of persistence.
To make more transparent the dependance of output persistence on a and thus on ¡, I
proceed now to further simplify (23). To do so, I need to specify a nominal spending growth
rule. To choose a speci¯cation that has some empirical appeal, note that, under the quantity
theory of money with a constant velocity, growth in nominal expenditure corresponds to growth
in nominal money supply. Hence, I consider a stationary ARMA(1,1) speci¯cation to allow the
empirically observed high-order dynamics in the response of money growth to an exogenous
monetary policy shock, as in Edge (2000). Speci¯cally, I consider the following process for ¹t,
¹t = ½¹t¡1 + ²t + '²t¡1; (24)
where ²t is a white noise process. I assume a zero steady-state growth in nominal expenditure,
corresponding to a zero steady-state in°ation rate, so there is no constant term in (24). While
22stationarity of ¹t requires j½j < 1 so that the autoregressive component of (24) can have a
MA(1) representation, invertibility of the moving average component of (24) requires j'j < 1.
Under the speci¯cation in (24), and given that jaj < 1 and j½j < 1, I can solve from (23)
the MA(1) representation for yt,
yt = '0²t +
1 X
i=1
('0ai + '1ai)²t¡i; (25)
where the coe±cients '0, '1, and ai are given by
'0 =










ai¡j¡1½j; 8i ¸ 1:
We note that if a 6= ½, then ai = (ai ¡ ½i)=(a ¡ ½) for all i ¸ 1. It can be veri¯ed that the
coe±cients of the in¯nite-order moving average process (25) are absolutely summable, so the
in¯nite sequence in (25) generates a well-de¯ned covariance-stationary process.
With (25), I can now derive analytically the impulse response function of real GDP following






= '0ai + '1ai; 8i ¸ 1: (27)
Thus, if a one percent shock occurs in ²t, then there will be an immediate output response
yt = '0 at time t, and subsequent responses yt+i = '0ai + '1ai at time t + i, for all i ¸ 1.
How persistent the responses are depends on how large are the responses at time t+i relative






ai; 8i ¸ 0; (28)
assuming '0 6= 0, and with the understanding that a0 ´ 0. Greater contract multipliers imply
more persistent output responses. It is worth noting that, both the actual impulse responses
(27) and the dynamic contract multipliers (28) depend only on i, the length of time separating
the shock (²t) and the observed value of the output response (yt+i). They do not depend on t;
that is, they do not depend on the date when the shock occurs or the dates of the observations
themselves.
With the closed-form solutions for output dynamics, I can now state the main results of
this subsection that the degree of persistence and the likelihood of a hump on the impulse
23response function of real GDP depend positively on a and thus negatively on ¡. Without loss
of generality, attention in the rest of this subsection will be restricted to the case in which
there is some degree of strategic complementarities and endogenous persistence, that is, to the
case with ¡ 2 (0;1) [thus with a 2 (0;1)]. I consider (½;') 2 [0;1)2 in the light of the empirical
evidence provided in Edge (2000).
Proposition 4.1: The values of the actual impulse responses (27) and the dynamic contract
multipliers (28) are strictly positive and strictly increasing in a (thus strictly decreasing in ¡).
Proposition 4:1 says that the response of real GDP to a positive (negative) innovation
in the growth rate of nominal expenditure is positive (negative) on impact, as well as in all
periods following the innovation. Given that a 2 (0;1) and ½ 2 [0;1), (26) and (27) imply
that limi!1(@yt+i=@²t) = 0, so that the e®ect will eventually die out. In fact, as will be
shown in the Appendix, once the response starts to level o® or decline, it will keep declining
forever and, therefore, will approach zero monotonically from that point onward. Yet, the
proposition says that the e®ect will die out more gradually, the greater is a. Further, it does
not preclude the possibility that the response may ¯rst increase before starting to decrease; that
is, it does not rule out the possibility of a hump-shaped impulse response function. What the
above observations do suggest is that there can be at most one hump in the impulse response
function, the existence of which requires that the response in the immediate subsequent period
following the innovation is greater than the response on impact.
Inspecting (26) and (28) reveals that a hump is more likely to occur, the greater is a (or the
smaller is ¡). This is so since, ¯rst, as will be shown in the Appendix, ('1='0)ai is increasing
in a (strictly increasing in a, unless ½ = ' = 0), and second, provided that a + ½ > 1, ai is
strictly increasing in i for small i. The following proposition characterizes the necessary and
su±cient condition for the existence of a hump in the impulse response function of real GDP.
Proposition 4.2: The impulse response function of real GDP is hump-shaped if and only if
¡ ·
"
¡(1 ¡ ½)(2 ¡ ½ ¡ ') +
p




As will be shown in the Appendix, (29) is the necessary and su±cient condition for the
inequality @yt+1=@²t ¸ @yt=@²t. As will also be shown there, there is generically no °at portion
24on the impulse response function of real GDP and, therefore, whenever this inequality holds
it holds mostly as a strict inequality, which, in light of the above discussions, is the necessary
and su±cient condition for the impulse response function to be hump-shaped.
Needless to say, a precondition for the possibility of a hump is for the upper bound in (29)
to be strictly positive.28 Whether or not this precondition holds depends upon the values of ½
and '. In the extreme case that ½ = ' = 0 (i.e., in the case that growth in nominal expenditure
follows a white noise process), the upper bound is zero and thus (29) will never be met and
a hump can never occur. But, as long as ½ and ' are not both 0, the upper bound is larger
than 0 and thus a hump is possible. In particular, there is the possibility of a hump if growth
in nominal expenditure follows a stationary AR(1) process [i.e., if ½ 2 (0;1) and ' = 0],29 an
invertible MA(1) process [i.e., if ½ = 0 and ' 2 (0;1)],30 or a stationary ARMA(1,1) process
with an invertible moving average component [i.e., if (½;') 2 (0;1)2]. In such a case, whether
a hump will actually occur depends upon how small is ¡ (or how large is a).31
28It can be shown that for (½;') 2 [0;1)
2 this upper bound always lies in [0,1).
29It is worth noting that neither the dynamic contract multipliers in (28) nor the upper bound in (29) are
monotone in ½, which measures the degree of persistence in an AR(1) nominal expenditure growth. For instance,
it can be veri¯ed that (@yt+1=@²t)=(@yt=@²t) is strictly increasing in ½ for ½ 2 (0;½
¤), but is strictly decreasing
in ½ for ½ 2 (½
¤;1), where ½
¤ = [2 ¡
p
2(1 ¡ a)]=(1 + a) is strictly between 0 and 1 for all a 2 (0;1). It can also
be shown that the upper bound in (29) is small as is ½ close to either 0 or 1, but it is much larger for moderate
values of ½. These observations suggest that a more persistent AR(1) nominal expenditure growth does not
necessarily imply a larger degree of output persistence, or a greater likelihood of a hump in the impulse response
function.
30It can be veri¯ed that both the dynamic contract multipliers in (28) and the upper bound in (29) are strictly
increasing in '. Therefore, the bigger is the moving average coe±cient in a MA(1) nominal expenditure growth
process, the larger is the degree of output persistence, and the greater is the likelihood of a hump in the impulse
response function.
31I focus here on output dynamics. As I show elsewhere, in°ation dynamics are given by









The general result is that the impulse response function of in°ation is always hump-shaped in such a Taylor-type
sticky-price (or sticky-wage) model, as long as ¡ < 1. This is true even with a random-walk money process (i.e.,
even with ½ = ' = 0). This stands in contrast to results which would be obtained in a Calvo-type sticky-price
(or sticky-wage) model. For instance, with a random-walk money process, neither the impulse response function
of output nor the impulse response function of in°ation can be hump-shaped in the latter model, regardless of
how small a ¡ the model is embodied with. Interested readers are referred to Huang (2004) for details.
25Related to the possibility of a hump is the issue concerning the timing of the hump. The
following proposition shows that, when the impulse response function of real GDP is indeed
hump-shaped, the magnitude of a (and thus of ¡) may also a®ect when the hump is to occur.
Proposition 4.3: Suppose there is a hump in the impulse response function of real GDP
following an innovation in the growth rate of nominal expenditure at time t. The time at which
the hump occurs is t + 1 + [i¤], where
i¤ =
8
> > > <
> > > :




'1a; if ½ > 0 and a = ½;
log'1+log(1¡½)¡log[(a¡½)'0+'1]¡log(1¡a)
loga¡log½ ; if ½ > 0 and a 6= ½;
(30)
and [i¤] denotes the largest integer not exceeding i¤.
The assumption of a hump in the impulse response function of real GDP implies that i¤ in
(30) is well-de¯ned and positive (see the Appendix). It can also be veri¯ed that i¤ is increasing
in a (and thus decreasing in ¡). Therefore, a greater a (or a smaller ¡) tends to induce a more
delayed peak in a hump-shaped impulse response function.
The results presented in this subsection so far have further detailed the messages conveyed
in Section 3. Since the degree of persistence, and the likelihood and timing of a hump are all
increasing in a and thus decreasing in ¡, the e®ect on ¡ derived from the negative interaction
between speci¯c factors and intermediate inputs has a negative consequence for propagation
of nominal shocks. To get a quantitative feel about this consequence, I plot in Figures 2-3 the
normalized impulse response of real GDP to a nominal expenditure growth shock [given by
the dynamic contract multipliers (28)] under factor speci¯cities. The ¯gures are generated for
the cases with AR(1) and ARMA(1,1) nominal expenditure growth processes, respectively. In
generating the ¯gures, I have set ¾ = 1, » = 20, ® = 0:33, and µ = 21, which are all empirically
plausible values. I consider each period in the model as corresponding to one quarter of a year,
and thus, with N = 2, the length of each price contract is equal to two quarters. Given the
quarterly frequency, I consider for the AR(1) process an autoregressive coe±cient of ½ = 0:57,
as in Chari et al. (2000), and I add in a moving average component with a coe±cient of
' = 0:93 for the ARMA(1,1) process, as in Edge (2000). Displayed in each ¯gure are four
panels, corresponding in a clockwise order to the cases with e = 0:1, e = 0:2, e = 0:5, and
e = 1. Five impulse response functions are plotted in each panel, corresponding to the cases
26with Á = 0 (solid line), Á = 0:3 (dashed line), Á = 0:5 (line with circles), Á = 0:7 (line with
stars), and Á = 0:9 (broken line with dots).
As these ¯gures make clear, the consequence of the negative interaction between speci¯c
factors and intermediate inputs is to reduce the degree of persistence in the response of real
GDP to a nominal expenditure growth shock (in both ¯gures), diminish the likelihood of a
hump on the impulse response (Figure 2), and shift to an earlier date the timing of the peak
on a hump-shaped impulse response (Figure 3). Although I have only displayed the ¯gures
for one set of empirically plausible parameter values (other than e and Á), similar results have
been obtained under other reasonable parameter values (not reported here).
4.2. Impulse Response Functions: Numerical Simulations
The assumption of a constant aggregate capital maintained thus far has allowed me to
obtain closed-form solutions to deliver the main messages of this paper in a highly transparent
way. As a robustness check to the main ¯ndings, I now relax this assumption and solve
numerically a fully speci¯ed monetary business cycle model with variable aggregate capital,
whereby money is introduced using the standard money-in-the-utility approach. Note that, up
to this point, I have not assumed any speci¯c form of the utility function, because the analytical
results obtained so far do not hinge upon such a speci¯cation. To conduct numerical simulations
in this subsection, I do need to specify a functional representation for the household's utility.
I assume that its period utility can be represented by the following parameterized function:
1
º





(1 ¡ Lhi)´di; (31)
where M= ¹ P denotes its real money balances. Its budget constraint in period t is accordingly
modi¯ed as




















Wi;tLhi;tdi + ¦t + TRt: (32)
Here 0:5ÃIi;t(Ii;t=Khi;t¡1)2 is a capital adjustment cost with a scale parameter Ã, and TRt is
a lump-sum transfer to the household. As are fKhi;¡1gi2[0;1] and B¡1, the household's initial
holdings of money, M¡1, is taken as given.
An equilibrium can be de¯ned similarly as in Section 2, with three modi¯cations. First,
money market clears, while money growth follows a process such as the one speci¯ed in (24).
Second, the market clearing condition for the composite good now also takes into account of
27total capital adjustment cost. Third, total production subsidy plus lump-sum transfer is equal
to total indirect business tax plus newly created money.
To compute an equilibrium, I ¯rst substitute out a number of variables and reduce the
log-linearized equilibrium conditions to N +2 equations, including a pricing equation, N Euler
equations for capitals, and an Euler equation for money. Once I have these equations, I
compute a Markov equilibrium in which prices and allocations are functions of the state of the
economy. The state variables are lagged prices, the beginning-of-period capital stocks, and the
money growth rate. The decision variables are current prices, investments, and consumption.
The details of the computation procedure and the Matlab code are available upon request.
Figures 4-5 report the simulated impulse response of real GDP, normalized by its initial
response, to a money growth shock under factor speci¯cities. The size of the shock is chosen so
that the money stock increases by one percent four quarters after the shock. In conducting the
simulations, I have set N = 4 (so the length of each price contract is equal to four quarters),
along with ® = 0:33, ¯ = 0:99, µ = 10, º = ¡1:56, b = 0:94, ± = 0:02, and e = 1, which are
all widely used parameter values in the literature.32 Figure 4 is generated under an AR(1)
money growth process (½ = 0:57) used in Chari et al. (2000), which is also in the line with
the evidence presented in King (1992), and Figure 5 is generated under an ARMA(1,1) money
growth process (½ = 0:53 and ' = 0:93) used in Edge (2000). There are four panels in each
¯gure, corresponding in a clockwise order to the cases with the labor supply elasticity of 1, 0:5,
0:25, and 0:1. The labor supply elasticity is linked to (1¡L)=L divided by (1¡´). Thus these
cases correspond to the values of ´ of ¡1, ¡3, ¡7, and ¡19, respectively, given a steady-state
leisure-labor ratio of 2. There are ¯ve output responses in each panel, corresponding to the
cases with the intermediate input share of 0 (solid line), 0:2 (dashed line), 0:4 (line with circles),
0:6 (line with stars), and 0:8 (broken line with dots). In each case, the capital adjustment cost
parameter Ã is adjusted so that the initial response of total investment is as 2:3 times large as
that of real GDP, in accordance with the empirical evidence of Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996).
Once again, as is evident from the ¯gures, the consequence of the negative interaction
between speci¯c factors and intermediate inputs is to reduce the degree of persistence in the
response of real GDP to a money growth shock, and to diminish the likelihood of a hump in the
impulse response function or shift to an earlier date the timing of the peak on a hump-shaped
impulse response. The results under other reasonable parameter values are similar, as I ¯nd in
32The values of º and b can be drawn from the money demand literature. See Chari et al. (2000) for details.
28a sensitivity analysis (not reported here). In sum, the numerical simulations conducted here
conform to the basic ¯ndings elaborated by the analytical results obtained earlier.
5. Concluding Remarks
A central challenge to monetary business-cycle theory is to ¯nd a solution to the problem
of persistence and delay in the response of real economic activity to nominal disturbances. In
meeting this challenge, various real features of the economy have been proposed to enhance the
staggered price mechanism, which was found unable by itself to solve the persistence problem.
Two such features, speci¯c factors and intermediate inputs, have been separately found helpful.
Models based on either of the two have also been used in the design of optimal monetary policy.
Yet these two individually promising mechanisms have not been investigated jointly.
The current paper represents some initial attempt in taking on this issue. I examine here
the interaction between speci¯c factors and intermediate inputs in a staggered price-setting
framework that features jointly these two sources of production inputs. My main ¯nding is on
an o®setting interaction between these two individually promising mechanisms, which leads to
a cancelation of much of the impact of each in propagating nominal shocks.
While this ¯nding manifests a kind of challenge in search for robust monetary transmission
mechanism and design of optimal monetary policy, it can be viewed as a useful step along
the road. One natural extension is to examine the interaction of the two real features under
state-dependent pricing, instead of time-dependent pricing. Dotsey and King (2001, 2005)
demonstrate that these pricing rules may have di®erent implications for di®erent real features.
Although the nature of the interaction between these two sources of production inputs is
unlikely to change under state-dependent pricing, as the intuitions illustrated in Section 3
suggest, the quantitative implications of such negative interaction under a state-dependent
pricing rule is certainly an issue worth investigating.
More broadly speaking, issues concerning the robustness of mechanisms have only started
to receive attention [e.g., Dotsey and King (2001, 2005)]. As Basu (2005) observes, in attempts
to solve the persistent problem, \The standard paper in this literature takes a workhorse model,
and then adds to it a scattering of the mechanisms that have been proposed to enhance the
model," while less attention has been paid to the interactions among the mechanisms. This
perhaps is harmless if the individual mechanisms are only independent or reinforcing. But this
paper shows that this is not always the case, and individually promising mechanisms can be
counter-forcing with a signi¯cant negative consequence. As Basu points out, an easy solution of
a set of robust mechanisms probably does not exist. Future research should both enhance our
29understanding and help our search for robust monetary transmission mechanism and design of
optimal monetary policy.
Appendix. Derivations and Proofs
Derivation of (13)-(14): Using the steady-state versions of (6) and (10), it is straightforward
to verify that the log-linear form of the marginal cost function is given by
qi;t = Á¹ pt + (1 ¡ Á)[®ri;t + (1 ¡ ®)wi;t]; (33)
where recall that Á = ~ Á¹1¡e represents the share of payment to the intermediate input in total
production cost in the steady state. The log-linearized labor supply equation is
wi;t ¡ ¹ pt = ¾yt + »lhi;t; (34)
where I have replaced ct with yt on the right-hand side of (34) given that aggregate capital is
constant with no depreciation.
To log-linearize the market clearing conditions for goods, capital, and labor, I need to
¯rst calibrate the ¯xed cost F. This can be done by setting steady-state pro¯t equal to zero,
while using the steady-state pricing relation and the balanced-budget condition that aggregate
production subsidy is ¯nanced by aggregate indirect business tax. I also want to allow the
case with no ¯xed cost. This gives rise to a uni¯ed representation of F = (¹IF ¡ 1)Z. Then
using (1), (7)-(9), and the steady-state pricing relation, I obtain the log-linear forms of the









(qi;t ¡ ¹ pt)di; (35)
0 = !1(qi;t ¡ ri;t + gi;t) + (1 ¡ !1)
Z 1
0
(qi;t ¡ ri;t + gi;t)di; (36)
lhi;t = !2(qi;t ¡ wi;t + gi;t) + (1 ¡ !2)
Z 1
0





(qi;t ¡ ¹ pt) + ¹¡IF[¡µ(pi;t ¡ ¹ pt) + zt]; (38)
and I have used the long-linear form of the price index ¹ pt =
R 1
0 pi;tdi in simplifying (35). I have
also used the fact that, in the case with factor homogeneity, all household members are faced
with economy-wide factor prices and thus makes identical factor supply decisions.
30From (33)-(38), the real marginal cost facing ¯rm i at t can be solved as
f(1 + ») ¡ [®(1 + »)!1 + »(1 ¡ ®)!2](1 ¡ eÁ)g (qi;t ¡ ¹ pt)
= (1 ¡ Á)
·





¡ (1 ¡ Á)[®(1 + »)!1 + »(1 ¡ ®)!2]µ¹¡IF (pi;t ¡ ¹ pt)
+
½
(1 ¡ Á)(» + ®)
eÁ
¹ ¡ Á
+ [®(1 + »)(1 ¡ !1) + »(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ !2)](1 ¡ eÁ)
¾Z 1
0
(qi;t ¡ ¹ pt)di:
Integrating (39) from 0 to 1 yields
Z 1
0















Substituting (40) back into (39) results in


















®(1+»)!1+»(1¡®)!2 ¡ 1 + eÁ
(pi;t ¡ ¹ pt): (41)
Equation (41) relates a ¯rm's marginal cost to its relative price in addition to aggregate
output. This is so unless both capital and labor are homogenous inputs, then all ¯rms face the
same marginal cost which is independent of ¯rms' relative prices but only of aggregate output.
Suppose at time t ¯rm i can set a new price. This new price, pi;t, once set, will be in e®ect for
N periods. That is, pi;t+s = pi;t for s = 0;:::;N ¡ 1. I can therefore write (41) for the ¯rm's
entire price contract duration as


























®(1+»)!1+»(1¡®)!2 ¡ 1 + eÁ
pi;t; for s = 0;:::;N ¡ 1:







where I have set ¯ = 1 for simplicity, and rearranging, give rise to equations (13) and (14),
where ~ yt+s = ¹ pt+s+yt+s denotes nominal aggregate spending in period t+s. Note that I have
dropped the individual ¯rms' index i on the left-hand side of (13) since ¯rms are completely
identi¯ed by the time at which they can set a new price. QED
31Proof of Proposition 3.1: Consider the case with a production subsidy that eliminates
steady-state monopolistic distortions. In this case, ¡ is given by
¡(Á) = (¾ + »)D(Á)
¡1(1 ¡ Á)(1 + »eÁ); (44)
where D(Á) ´ 1 + »µ + »(e ¡ µ)Á, which is clearly positive for all Á 2 [0;1). Thus ¡(Á) is C1
on [0;1). Its ¯rst order derivative is ¡0(Á) = (¾ + »)D(Á)
¡2F(Á), where
F(Á) = »2e(µ ¡ e)Á2 ¡ 2»e(1 + »µ)Á + (»2µe ¡ 1): (45)
Given that e > e, if e = µ, then F(Á) is a negatively-sloped straight line that crosses the Á-axis
strictly between 0 and 1. If e 6= µ, then F(Á) is a quadratic function, and there are two real
roots to the equation F(Á) = 0, one of which is always strictly between 0 and 1. In the case
that e > µ, F(Á) is strictly concave and the other root is smaller than 0; while in the case that
e < µ, F(Á) is strictly convex and the other root is greater than 1. These together show that
there exists Á¤ 2 (0;1) such that (18) holds.
I next use (44) to obtain ¡(Á) ¡ ¡(0) = (¾ + »)(1 + »µ)¡1D(Á)
¡1G(Á), where
G(Á) = ¡»e(1 + »µ)Á2 + (»2µe ¡ 1)Á: (46)
Clearly, G(Á) is a strictly concave function. There are two real roots to the equation G(Á) = 0,
one of which is always 0 while the other of which is always smaller than 1. Given that e > e,
this second root is greater than 0. This combined with the previous paragraph implies that
there exists Á¤¤ 2 (Á¤;1) such that (19) holds.
The proof for the case with steady-state monopolistic distortions is much more involved,
and is thus omitted here but available upon request from the author. QED
Proof of Proposition 4.1: Given that a 2 (0;1) and (½;') 2 [0;1)2, it is clear from (26)
that '0 and ai are strictly positive and '1 is positive (strictly positive unless ½ = ' = 0). It is




(1 ¡ ½2) + a(1 ¡ ½)[2(1 + ') ¡ a(1 + ½)] + (1 ¡ ½')(1 ¡ a)2




(1 ¡ ½)(½ + ')(1 + a)[2 + ½(1 ¡ a)]






2(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ')(½ + ')
[(1 ¡ ½)(1 + a) + (1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ a)]2:
It follows that '0 is strictly increasing in a, and '1 and '1='0 are increasing in a (strictly
increasing in a unless ½ = ' = 0). Finally, the third equation in (26) reveals that a1 = 1 and
ai is strictly increasing in a for all i > 1. QED
32Proof of Proposition 4.2: I ¯rst show that, once the response of real GDP to an innovation
in the growth rate of nominal expenditure starts to level o® or decline, it will keep declining














To prove (49) for all j ¸ i, it su±ces to prove it for j = i. Using (27), I can write (48) as
'0(1 ¡ a)ai¡1 ¸ '1(ai ¡ ai¡1); (50)
and write (49) for the case with j = i as
'0(1 ¡ a)ai > '1(ai+1 ¡ ai): (51)
If ½ = 0, then from (26), (51) reduces to (a'0 +'1)(1¡a)ai¡1 > 0, which clearly holds. I thus
only need to prove (51) for the case with ½ > 0. Using (26), (50) is equivalent to







a; if a = ½; (52)
[(a ¡ ½)'0 + '1](1 ¡ a)ai¡1 ¸ '1(1 ¡ ½)½i¡1; if a > ½;
and (51) is equivalent to







a; if a = ½; (53)
[(a ¡ ½)'0 + '1](1 ¡ a)ai > '1(1 ¡ ½)½i; if a > ½:
Note that, since ½ > 0, we have '1 > 0. It is then straightforward to show that each of the
three weak inequalities in (52) implies in order each of the three strict inequalities in (53).
The above result and the fact that the output response will die out eventually (see the
paragraph following Proposition 4:1) imply that, (i) there can be at most one hump on the
impulse response function, and (ii) the impulse response function is indeed hump-shaped if and
only if the response in the immediate subsequent period following the innovation is greater than
33the response on impact, that is, if and only if @yt+1=@²t ¸ @yt=@²t.33 In light of (26) and (28),
this necessary and su±cient condition for a hump is equivalent to
(1 ¡ ½)(½ + ')(1 + a)
(1 ¡ ½)(1 + a) + (1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ a)
¸ 1 ¡ a; (54)





+ (1 ¡ ½)(2 ¡ ½ ¡ ')
p
¡ ¡ (1 ¡ ½)(½ + ') · 0: (55)
Now view the left side of (55) as a function of
p
¡, and denote it by J(
p
¡). Note that this
is a strictly convex function, given that ' 2 [0;1). There exist two real roots to the equation
J(
p
¡) = 0, the smaller of which is negative, while the larger of which is nonnegative and
equal to the nonnegative square root of the upper bound in (29). It follows that, (55) holds if
and only if (29) does. QED










or, in light of (27), such that
'0ai¡1 + '1ai¡1 · '0ai + '1ai > '0ai+1 + '1ai+1: (57)
I now break into three cases.
Case 1 : ½ = 0
It is easy to verify that, for all i ¸ 1, the second inequality in (57) holds if and only if
(a'0 + '1)(1 ¡ a)ai > 0. This strict inequality always holds. Thus the hump can only occur
at time t + 1.
Case 2 : ½ > 0 and a = ½
I derive from (57) the following two inequalities,
'0ai¡1 + (i ¡ 1)'1ai¡2 · '0ai + i'1ai¡1 > '0ai+1 + (i + 1)'1ai: (58)
Using (58) to solve for i, I obtain






a < i: (59)
33As will be shown in the proof of Proposition 4:3, there is generically no °at portion in the impulse response
function and, therefore, whenever this inequality holds it holds mostly as a strict inequality.
34Case 3 : ½ > 0 and a 6= ½



































Using (60) to solve for i, I obtain
i ¡ 1 ·
log'1 + log(1 ¡ ½) ¡ log[(a ¡ ½)'0 + '1] ¡ log(1 ¡ a)
loga ¡ log½
< i: (61)
The assumption of a hump implies '1='0 ¸ 1¡a, which in turn implies (a¡½)'0+'1 > 0.
It can then be veri¯ed that the middle terms in (59) and (61) are well de¯ned and positive.
Meanwhile, the fact that these middle terms are positive guarantees the existence of strictly
positive integers i that satisfy (59) and (61). Let i¤ be de¯ned as in (30). Then the hump shall
occur at time t+i for i¤ < i · 1+i¤, that is, it shall occur at t+i = t+[1+i¤] = t+1+[i¤].
Generically, i¤ so de¯ned is not an integer, so there is generically no °at portion in the impulse
response function. This implies, as can be easily veri¯ed, that whenever the weak inequality
in (56) holds, it holds mostly as a strictly inequality. QED
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Figure 1. ¡ as a function of Á: In each panel, the ¯ve curves, from bottom to top, correspond
in order to the cases with e = 0, 0:1, 0:2, 0:5, and 1, respectively.




































Figure 2. The normalized impulse response of real GDP (in quarters after a nominal
expenditure growth shock). Each panel plots ¯ve impulse response functions, corresponding
to the cases with Á = 0 (solid line), Á = 0:3 (dashed line), Á = 0:5 (line with circle),
Á = 0:7 (line with star), and Á = 0:9 (broken line with dot), respectively.
With an AR(1) nominal expenditure growth process (½ = 0:57 and ' = 0).
(The length of each price contract is equal to two quarters.)




























































Figure 3. The normalized impulse response of real GDP (in quarters after a nominal
expenditure growth shock). Each panel plots ¯ve impulse response functions, corresponding
to the cases with Á = 0 (solid line), Á = 0:3 (dashed line), Á = 0:5 (line with circle),
Á = 0:7 (line with star), and Á = 0:9 (broken line with dot), respectively.
With an ARMA(1,1) nominal expenditure growth process (½ = 0:57 and ' = 0:93).
(The length of each price contract is equal to two quarters.)
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Figure 4. The normalized impulse response of real GDP (in quarters after a money growth
shock). Each panel plots ¯ve impulse response functions, corresponding to the cases with
Á = 0 (solid line), Á = 0:2 (dashed line), Á = 0:4 (line with circle),
Á = 0:6 (line with star), and Á = 0:8 (broken line with dot), respectively.
With an AR(1) money growth process (½ = 0:57 and ' = 0).
(The length of each price contract is equal to four quarters.)
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Figure 5. The normalized impulse response of real GDP (in quarters after a money growth
shock). Each panel plots ¯ve impulse response functions, corresponding to the cases with
Á = 0 (solid line), Á = 0:2 (dashed line), Á = 0:4 (line with circle),
Á = 0:6 (line with star), and Á = 0:8 (broken line with dot), respectively.
With an ARMA(1,1) money growth process (½ = 0:53 and ' = 0:93).
(The length of each price contract is equal to four quarters.)
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